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13. Just sue the bastards? An assessment
of the alternative to negative
harmonization of regulatory
priorities
Geert van Calster
1. INTRODUCTION
In this contribution I summarily, and largely in essay style, review the
state of, and challenges to, the main alternative to negative harmonization
of regulatory priorities. I introduce the concepts of regulatory autonomy,
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ harmonization; I highlight the shortcomings in
the approach of the European Union (EU or Union) (the EU often being
hailed as having the better approach to the issues under consideration); I
review the achievements of both negative and positive harmonization at
the level of the World Trade Organization (WTO); and I end with
succinct references to similar issues in mega-free trade agreements
(FTAs).
2. ‘REGULATORY AUTONOMY’ IN TRADE
AGREEMENTS
Trade and regulatory law collide where barriers to trade are established in
the name of regulatory, non-trade priorities. The usual suspects among
these latter priorities are environmental protection, public health and
consumer protection, although the list is by definition endless. Indeed,
the unpredictable character of what at some point in time might emerge
as requiring protection, even if the protective measures clash with free
trade, is what prompted the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to develop
its case law on the ‘rule of reason’. This case law supplemented the EEC
Treaty-sanctioned exceptions to free trade, with a judge-invented regime
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protecting newer, modern societal values which the Treaty drafters did
not or could not anticipate.
Any modern (post 1940s) trade agreement in principle respects ‘regu-
latory autonomy’. That is to say, all self-respecting trade agreements
allow their states’ signatories to give priority to regulatory concerns over
and above free trade, subject to conditions to avoid abuse. The appli-
cation of these conditions then leads to discussion and to so-called ‘Trade
and … [complete with the relevant regulatory interest]’ disputes.
Tension between these signatory states over the use of regulatory
autonomy may be the result of diverging regulatory responses to envir-
onmental etc. problems, and discussion as to whether the other’s response
is effective in addressing the concern at hand. Especially for regulatory
concerns of a truly international kind (such as climate change, the
protection of the ozone layer and the oceans), states may indeed have a
genuine regulatory goal in mind when they complain about another
state’s actions. It is, however, more common for a state to suggest that a
particular regulatory response in fact amounts to disguised protectionism
(rather than arguing that it is insufficient in meeting its regulatory goal):
in those cases, the complaining state often does not itself have a regime
aimed at protecting the same regulatory value.
3. ‘REGULATORY AUTONOMY’, ‘NEGATIVE’ AND
‘POSITIVE’ HARMONIZATION
Systems of ‘deep integration’, such as the EU, combine negative with
positive harmonization. ‘Negative harmonization’ is said to occur when
trade barriers are dismantled by the intervention of a dispute settlement
mechanism (a Panel, or a court of some kind and denomination). This
dispute settlement mechanism applies a set of rules, typically formulated
as prohibitions: ‘Thou shall not hinder the free movement of [goods,
capital, services …]’. The mechanism is called ‘negative’ because: (i) it
requires a breach of the rules, which is then disciplined; (ii) it is
necessarily ad hoc: litigation against an individual measure is required to
trigger the court’s intervention; and (iii) most importantly, because
suspicion (not in fact always supported by data) has always been that this
type of court intervention triggers downwards harmonization or a ‘race to
the bottom’: the phenomenon whereby states that have been, or are in
fear of being, rebuked by the relevant court, lower their regulatory
standards, triggering a general incentive not to raise the regulatory bar.
This is where ‘positive’ harmonization comes in. It comes in many
forms and degrees of intensity, but it may be summarized as follows.
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Using some kind of legislative procedure, it proactively harmonizes the
non-trade regulatory standard across the Members of the trading com-
munity concerned. Having provided a debated and agreed regulatory
floor (sometimes also a ceiling) across the trade community, it takes
away the temptation and justification for unilateral action.
Various contributions in this volume address the legality, under inter-
national trade law, of national measures that address regulatory con-
cerns.1 This is therefore not the focus of my contribution. Rather, using
the EU’s positive harmonization agenda (and accomplishments, as well
as shortcomings) as a benchmark, I review the positive harmonization
potential, and achievements, in the international community.
4. THE EU: A SHINING EXAMPLE?
Through its harmonization process, the EU has established an extensive
set of common EU regulatory laws. Taken together, EU law covers many
if not all of the regulatory areas which, at the WTO level, cause tension
among Members. Such positive harmonization achievements have no
equivalent in the WTO: this is common knowledge (see also further).
However, the EU’s approach is not a panacea, as I further outline below.
The crucial advantage of positive harmonization is that it ought to
counter states’ incentives to introduce measures unilaterally. WTO ‘trade
and’ practice has been dogged by unilateral action. Positive harmon-
ization could counter this.
There is merit in examining the EU’s approach of regulatory
autonomy, even though obviously one needs to be aware of the chalk-
and-cheese element in the comparison. Wherever comparisons are made
between regional arrangements, such as the EU, and the international
trade system spearheaded by the WTO, a word of caution is appropriate.
Each of these systems, of course, operates within its own context. The
EU’s trade policy is embedded in the overall goals of the Union. Even
though internal market principles, including the ‘four freedoms’, stood at
the cradle of the European Communities, the Treaties have always aimed
for more than merely economic objectives. One of the challenges of the
GATT/WTO today is precisely the identification of its agenda. These
agreements are fundamentally pure trade agreements, and the integration
1 See also G. van Calster and D. Prévost, (eds), Research Handbook on
Environment, Health and the WTO (Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA,
USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013).
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of values such as environmental and social protection obliges them to
assess their ‘mission’.
Some of the provisions of the original Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community were almost literally copied from the 1947
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article III:4 and 5
GATT prohibits protectionism in the application of internal regulatory
measures; Article XI GATT prohibits quantitative restrictions; the
original Articles 9, 12, 30 and 34 EEC2 prohibit tariffs, quantitative
restrictions, and other measures which directly or indirectly, actually or
potentially, hinder trade.
Article XX GATT secures domestic policy autonomy, provided
national measures do not involve arbitrary discrimination, are not dis-
guised restrictions on trade, and meet the specific conditions of the
subparagraphs, which contain a closed list of legitimate policy objectives.
The original Article 36 EC secures domestic policy autonomy, provided
the measures concerned further the policy goals enumerated in that
article, do not involve arbitrary discrimination or disguised restrictions on
trade, and meet the conditions of the proportionality test (including
necessity).
While the texts may be similar or in places even identical, little is to be
learnt from merely comparing the application of these texts by the ECJ
and the WTO dispute settlement institutions respectively. It is probably
more relevant to study the mechanisms behind developments in both
policy and case law.
Despite the inherent difficulty of having to compare two substantially
different sets of international law, and notwithstanding the caution
expressed below in section 4, the experience of the EU is a useful
reference for the WTO. Clearly, if regulatory autonomy issues are to be
resolved successfully, a great deal of cooperation will have to be realized
between the trade and the regulatory community. The EU is ‘lucky’ in
that its agenda includes both trade and the various regulatory policies.
The WTO, by contrast, clearly has no immediate regulatory agenda. Its
rules do, however, equally clearly, have a high impact on non-trade
regulation. Arguably, in light of this impact, the absence of clear
regulatory policies in its mandate obliges the WTO to broker a successful
partnership on ‘trade and …’ issues with the international regulatory
community.
2 Previously Articles 9, 12, 30 and 34 EC. Various Treaty amendments have
led to a general renumbering of these Articles.
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Three arguments figure strongly in commentators’ caution in compar-
ing the EU and the GATT set-up.3 Firstly, the GATT has far more limited
ratione materiae. GATT had set trade liberalization as its goal, while
even in the original EC social cohesion and regional redistribution of
wealth, among others, figured alongside economic development as the
Communities’ purpose. Secondly, GATT’s institutional structure – and, in
particular, the weaknesses of its dispute settlement provisions (which
make it more of a political/diplomatic instrument than a legal one) – have
prevented ‘creative lawmaking’. Finally, the homogeneity among EC
Member States was already far greater than that among GATT Members.
In the WTO, the first two arguments arguably no longer hold. Firstly,
even though such issues as environmental protection and social cohesion
are not among the WTO’s aims, the WTO Agreement nevertheless has
formally recognized the need for these considerations to be taken into
account in the further liberalization of international trade. Secondly, the
dispute settlement provisions of the WTO are, of course, far more
advanced than those of the GATT, including the provision that Panel and
Appellate Body Reports are deemed to be accepted unless rejected by
unanimity. It is only the third argument which may reflect a reality that is
still in place. For instance, one of the elements of the ECJ’s ‘mutual
recognition’ jurisprudence4 is the requirement that Member States recog-
nize each other’s measures which serve the protection of the interest
concerned, when adopting stricter rules or in the absence of Union
harmonization. This includes, for instance, the existence of adequate
health and sanitary inspections in the exporting Member State. This
represents an application of good faith, mutual confidence and quasi-
federal loyalty, which is not justified in the WTO (see also below, in the
discussion on judicial activism at section 6.1. below).
One crucial characteristic of the EU, which is a precondition for
making its harmonization programme a success, is its supranational
nature. Through the doctrine of the supremacy of Union law and the
direct effect of some of its provisions, EU law penetrates directly into the
legal regimes of the Member States. The WTO remains a classic
instrument of international diplomacy, with no equivalent in most of its
Members of the direct effect doctrine: very few WTO Members accept
3 See, e.g., P. Demaret, ‘TREMs, Multilateralism and the GATT’, in J.
Cameron, P. Demaret and D. Geradin (eds), Trade and the Environment: The
Search for Balance (London: Cameron May, 1994), pp. 52–68, at 65.
4 Which, subject to exceptions, foresees that Member States are obliged to
allow the marketing, on their territory, of products manufactured in accordance
with the laws and regulations of the ‘home’ Member State.
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that WTO provisions may be called upon directly by private parties in
dispute settlement proceedings in their national courts.
5. A WORD OF CAUTION ON THE EU’S LEADING
ROLE
In theory, where EU harmonization has been set in place through
‘secondary law’,5 regulatory action of its Member States must comply
with these provisions rather than with the Treaty’s regime of exceptions
to free trade rules. As states all follow the same rulebook, the ‘Trade
and …’ debate ought to be resolved. However, for a variety of reasons, in
practice there are several instances where this overall ambition has not
quite worked.
5.1 The Issue of ‘Pre-emption’or ‘Occupation of the Field’, and
Pre-emption Cut Off by the ‘Environmental Guarantee’
It is established case law6 that recourse to the exceptions of Article 36 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (the
exceptions Article which allows for infringements of the free movement
of goods) and/or of the ‘rule of reason’ is no longer possible where
Union law has exhaustively harmonized the national legislation at issue.
National measures derogating from the harmonized regime are then said
to be ‘pre-empted’ by the Union initiative, which ‘occupies the field’.
The underlying assumption is that the protection of the interests caught
under Article 36 and under the ‘rule of reason’ is guaranteed by Member
States’ approval (via the legislative procedure and voting requirements)
of the measures concerned. The keyword is ‘exhaustive’. The EU’s
regime must have laid down a complete regulatory mechanism for the
issues under consideration. Where it deals only with partial elements of a
regime, and/or one that is not considered to rule out national initiative in
5
‘Primary law’ is the body of rules included (mainly) in the EU Treaties.
Secondary law is adopted through the legislative procedures detailed in the
Treaties.
6 See e.g. Case 227/82, Van Bennekom [1983] ECR 388, at para. 15; Case
C-347/89, Freistaat Bayern v Eurim-Pharm GmbH [1991] ECR I-1747, at para.
26. Controversially applied in Case C-1/96, The Queen v Minister of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food, ex parte Compassion in World Farming Ltd [1998] ECR
I-1251 (Compassion). See G. Van Calster, ‘Export Restrictions – A Watershed for
Article 30’ (2000) 25 European Law Review 335–52.
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the area, Member States may continue to regulate provided they do not
exceed the limits of that regulatory autonomy under primary law.
Confused? Readers should be: the ins and outs of the complex regime of
pre-emption and exhaustion wrong-foots many a practitioner and national
official. This is compounded by the fact that there is no such thing as an
‘exhaustion clause’ in secondary law. EU secondary law does not say in
so many words whether it is exhaustive or not: one has to detect it, taking
clues from the wording of the text, its preparatory history and preparatory
works – with, of course, the Court of Justice being the final judge of the
exhaustive (or not) character.
It is also noteworthy that the underlying assumption of pre-emption no
longer holds where legislation is based upon Article 192 TFEU (the
environmental legal basis) or Article 114 TFEU (harmonization in the
framework of the internal market) in the light of the (albeit conditional)
room for Member States to introduce permanent deviations from the
legislation at issue. These Articles grant Member States the conditional
right to introduce stricter measures, in particular, for reasons of environ-
mental protection or occupational health and safety, and they serve as a
permanent (albeit strictly regulated) hurdle to pre-emption.7
5.2 The Use of Minimum Harmonization Creates anAnchor Point for
Many a Discussion
Section 5.1 discussed whether Member States may take measures protect-
ing regulatory measures in a stricter way than proscribed by secondary
law: that is, whether they can call upon the Treaty’s protection of
non-trade regulatory interests even where there has been positive harmon-
ization. In many areas, however, discussion centres around the question
whether Member States have even achieved reaching the goals identified
by those laws.
The harmonization model used in the EU positively encourages lots of
discussion on whether Member States abide by its requirements. In many
regulatory areas (food law being a notable, if partial, exception), harmon-
ization in the EU uses the so-called ‘minimum harmonization’ model,
which leaves quite a lot of wriggle room (and hence room for discussion)
even following legislative intervention.
7 See also G. Van Calster, ‘Green Unilateralism – The European Commis-
sion and the Environmental Guarantee of Article 95 EC’ (2000) 9 European
Environmental Law Review 232–6. (Note that Article 95 EC is a predecessor of
the current Article 114 TFEU.)
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During an initial period, EU legislators attempted to effectively replace
national law with European law in areas relevant to the internal market
(the so-called ‘total harmonization’ approach). The requirement of
unanimity for approval of such secondary legislation, as it then existed,
proved to make consensus on many, even technical issues, all but
impossible. The need to change tack was made all the more urgent
following the ECJ’s finding in Cassis de Dijon,8 in which it held that the
free movement of goods articles of the Treaty effectively impose mutual
recognition of national product requirements. What followed was both a
Treaty change in the requirement of unanimity (the introduction of
qualified majority voting, in the Single European Act) and a change in
the general approach to harmonization, now dubbed the ‘New
Approach’:9 rather than exhausting itself in detail, a Directive now sets
out general principles.
Where suitable (in particular, when it comes to product standards; far
less frequently for process standards), these are further detailed in
technical standards developed by the relevant standardization bodies,
under mandate of the European Commission. However, these eventual
standards, even where they do exist, are never obligatory. Rather, they are
an optional means for manufacturers to enjoy free movement more easily
(and, as noted, they do not have an equivalent in areas where the EU has
harmonized the levels of regulatory protection in production processes, as
opposed to products, and even less of an equivalent in the services, as
opposed to the goods, sector).
Finally, an important feature which defines minimum harmonization is
the use of a regulatory floor. Once the floor is met, products originating
anywhere can travel freely within the EU. However, Member States are
free to impose stricter conditions upon their own industry, and there is no
identity of regulation between the various Member States: only a
guarantee of minimum protection.
Whether a particular Member State has properly enacted the minimum
floor in its national laws is often a first point of debate (particularly in the
environmental sector, which has the highest rate of infringement proceed-
ings for non-implementation and non-compliance in the ECJ). A subse-
quent level of complication arises as a result of so-called ‘safeguard
clauses’ in the legislation itself. These are provisions negotiated by
8 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Brannt-
wein [1979] ECR 649.
9 See, in particular, Communication of the Commission to the Council on
the New Approach in Technical Harmonization, COM(85) 19, adopted by the
Council in its Resolution of 7 May 1985, [1985] OJ C 136/1.
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(typically a group of) Member States and which provide for exceptions to
the unified regime which the legislation entails. Such exceptions are often
subject to conditions (often even Commission approval) and they are
typically also time-limited.
In summary, if readers are confused after reading sections 5.1 and 5.2,
I have them exactly where I want them to be (and indeed where Member
States often are). Far from providing a high level of certainty, the EU’s
prima facie very promising use of positive harmonization hides many
layers of complexity. This is not to say that positive harmonization in the
EU is a failure; rather, that it is a continuous process of adaptation and
fine tuning, which requires a heavy legislative and executive machinery
under the control of the courts.
5.3 PPMs and Free Movement of Goods
A further illustration of the unfinished nature of the EU’s harmonization
approach is that, until quite recently, the ECJ has not had to deal with
cases involving product distinctions based on processes and production
methods (PPMs) in the area of trade in goods. PPMs are a long-running
staple part of the regulatory autonomy debate in the WTO. PPMs in the
general sense are all ways in which a product is being produced. If that
method of production is not reflected in the final product, the PPM
concerned is referred to as an ‘n-PR PPM’. For reasons outside the scope
of this chapter, PPMs in general and n-PR PPMs in particular are
something of an obsession in the legal debate on regulatory autonomy in
the WTO.
In the first cases in which the ECJ was asked to address PPMs – in
particular, Lomas10 and Compassion11 (but also in Dusseldorp)12 – the
ECJ effectively avoided having to tackle the PPM issue by confining the
10 Case C-5/94, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex
parte Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd [1996] ECR I-2553. See my review in G. van
Calster (1996) 3 Columbia Journal of European Law 132–45, available at
http://www.cjel.net/print/3_1-van-calster.
11 Compassion, n. 6 above.
12 Case C-203/96, Chemische Afvalstoffen Dusseldorp and Others v VROM
[1998] ECR I-4075. See my review in G. van Calster, ‘Court Criticises
Restrictions on Free Movement of Waste’ (1999) 24(2) European Law Review
181, 183.
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analysis to the rather complex theory behind pre-emption and harmo-
nization (reviewed above, section 5.1). The judgments concerned pro-
voked controversy and led to scepticism in the regulatory community,
just as the two Tuna/Dolphin cases did within the context of the GATT.13
The Court had, however, previously considered the PPM issue in its
case law on what is now Article 110 TFEU: the core article on tax
discrimination (effectively the EU counterpart of GATT Article III:2). In
according Member States room for manoeuvre to discriminate between
products on the basis of regulatory priorities, the ECJ simply dismissed
any relevance for the non-product v product-incorporated issue, focusing
instead on arbitrary discrimination and the legitimacy of a regulatory
priority, judged on the basis of the EU’s own non-trade regulatory
priorities and on international law.14
Most recently, the non-product-related n-PR PPM issue came to the
fore in the ECJ’s case law on national incentive schemes for domestically
produced renewable energy. In Vindkraft and in Essent, the Court insists
on transparent and non-discriminatory market-based instruments being
required to justify the market infringement of the national schemes at
issue under the Treaty’s free movement of goods rules, again not being
preoccupied with the n-PR PPM issue per se.15
5.4 Can Member States be ‘Too’Non-Trade Friendly? ECJ Review of
the Level of Protection
The ECJ has not unequivocally indicated that it sees itself fit to judge the
very level of regulatory protection sought by Member States in the
absence of EU harmonization. Most judgments would seem to indicate
that it does not; however, the jury is out (see, for instance, the Opinion of
the AG in Danish Bottles16).
13 GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS21/R, DS21/R, 3 September 1991, unadopted, BISD 39S/155 (US – Tuna
(Mexico)); GATT Panel Report, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS29/R, 16 June 1994, unadopted (US – Tuna (EEC)).
14 See G. van Calster, ‘Topsy-Turvy: the European Court of Justice and
Border (Energy) Tax Adjustments – Should the World Trade Organization Follow
Suit?’, in Critical Issues in International Environmental Taxation, Vol. 2 (Lon-
don: Richmond Law and Tax, 2003), pp. 311–41.
15 See my review: G. van Calster, ‘Climate Change and Renewable Energy as
a Super Trump for EU Trade Law. All Essent Clear’ (2014) 1 Renewable Energy
Law and Policy Review 60–66.
16 Case 302/86, Commission v Denmark [1988] ECR 4607.
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The ECJ does not suggest a weighing and balancing test such as that
proposed (granted, somewhat fuzzily) by the WTO Appellate Body,17
among others, in the light of the Treaty’s integration principle. However,
cases involving the precautionary principle suggest a lot of sympathy for
generally giving (in particular) environmental protection, public health
and occupational health and safety the benefit of the doubt when it comes
to their impact on trade: in other words, the ECJ is not generally minded
to rebuke Member States for being ‘too’ regulatory friendly (again, only
outside the context of harmonization).
5.5 Are Extraterritorial MeasuresAllowed?
The ECJ has not unequivocally decided whether Member States may take
unilateral initiatives to protect the environment in other Member States.
This ‘extraterritoriality’ issue has been at the centre of a majority of the
trade and environment discussions in the WTO.18 It was debated in the
Tuna/Dolphin cases, references to it were made in Shrimp/Turtle,19 and
had the EU’s Leghold Trap Regulation20 ever been brought before the
WTO, it would have been crucial again. (In the similar and later EU –
Seal Products case,21 the EU – as readers will know – pulled the ‘public
morals’ card, which pre-empted a discussion of the extraterritoriality
issue).
The European Court, by contrast, did not address the issue in either
Scottish Grouse,22 Lomas, Compassion, or Dusseldorp, even though all
17 See my critical review in G. van Calster, ‘Faites vos jeux – Regulatory
Autonomy and the World Trade Organization after Brazil Tyres’ (2008) 20(1)
Journal of Environmental Law 121–36.
18 See C. Ryngaert and M. Koekkoek (Chapter 10, this volume) and P.
Mavroidis (Chapter 12, this volume).
19 Panel Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R and Corr.1, adopted 6 November 1998; Appellate
Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998.
20 Council Regulation No. 3254/91 of 4 November 1991 prohibiting the use
of leghold traps in the Community and the introduction into the Community of
pelts and manufactured goods of certain wild animal species originating in
countries which catch them by means of leghold traps or trapping methods which
do not meet international humane trapping standards, OJ [1991] L308/1.
21 Appellate Body Report, EC – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400/AB/R, adopted 18 June 2014.
22 Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings against Gourmetterie Van den Burg
[1990] ECR I-2143.
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these could be taken to involve some degree of extraterritoriality. In two
cases involving the Waste Shipments Regulation (WSR), Regulation
1013/2006,23 the Court did hold that that Regulation allows for objec-
tions to shipments of waste, within strict conditions, if the Member State
of dispatch considers that the environment or the occupational health and
safety of those having to handle the waste would not be sufficiently
protected by the standards applicable in the state of destination. In
EU – Wood Trading24 the ECJ was of the view that the objectives to
protect health and environment, which the Union legislature targets with
the WSR, could be compromised if shipments of waste between Member
States were not perceived in their entirety – that is to say, from the point
of departure of the waste in the state of dispatch to the end of its
processing in the state of destination. In Pedersen25 it clarified the
potential to call upon stricter standards in the Member State of dispatch
in order to refuse shipment. The Court first of all held that the WSR
implies that the authorities, in assessing the risks which recovery of
waste carried out in the state of destination would entail for human health
and the environment, may take account of all relevant criteria in that
regard, including those which are in force in the state of dispatch, even if
they are stricter than those of the state of destination, and provided they
are intended to avoid those risks. The authorities of dispatch cannot,
however, be bound by the criteria of their state if such criteria are no
more apt to avoid those risks than those of the state of destination.
Moreover, opposition by the authority of dispatch on the basis of its
national waste recovery standards to a shipment can only be lawful in so
far as those standards, in compliance with the principle of proportional-
ity, are apt to attain the objectives pursued, which are intended to prevent
risks for human health and the environment, and do not go beyond what
is necessary to attain them.26
These cases, judged within the specific context of the WSR, do not
divulge an overall view of the ECJ on the legality of extraterritorial
measures.
23 Regulation (EC) No. 1013/2006 on shipments of waste, [2006] OJ L
190/1.
24 Case C-277/02, EU-Wood-Trading GmbH v Sonderabfall-Management-
Gesellschaft Rheinland-Pfalz mbH [2004] ECR I-11957.
25 Case C-215/04, Marius Pedersen A/S v Miljostyrelsen [2006] ECR
I-01465.
26 More details on those cases in G. van Calster, Handbook of EU Waste Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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6. ‘NEGATIVE HARMONIZATION’ – THE ROLE OF
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
6.1 The WTO and JudicialActivism
Is the WTO dispute settlement mechanism equipped to play the crucial
role which the ECJ has played? The role of the ECJ in addressing trade
and environment concerns in the EU has been crucial. The ECJ has not
confined itself to a textual interpretation of Community, and later Union,
law. It has followed a proactive approach, moving the issues forward in
what it perceived as being the best interest of the Union.
GATT and WTO dispute settlement Panels and the WTO Appellate
Body (AB) have traditionally stuck to a literal and textual interpretation
of the Agreement, and arguably continue to do so. A good recent
illustration are the China – Raw Materials and China – Rare Earth
cases.27 In that debate, on the room for manoeuvre for a new WTO
Member in the context of its regulatory autonomy, both Panels and the
AB could have developed arguments related to a WTO ‘constitutional
body’ of law (in response to a technical point on China’s Protocol of
Accession), but failed to do so.
Contrasting the debate on ‘green’ Border Tax Adjustment,28 within
both the EC/EU and in the WTO, may serve as a good example of the
very different overall approach of the respective dispute settlement
institutions. The current Article 110 TFEU (previously Article 90 EC),
which regulates the internal taxation regime of Member States where it
has an effect on Union trade (much like GATT’s Article III), is rigid in its
conception. However, in the light of the overall slow progress in tax
harmonization and the sensitivity of national fiscal legislation, the ECJ
has allowed Member States considerable leeway under Article 110. It has
held that Union law does not restrict the freedom of each Member State
to lay down tax arrangements which differentiate between certain prod-
ucts on the basis of objective criteria, such as the nature of the raw
materials used or the production processes employed. Such differenti-
ation is considered compatible with Union economic law if it is: (i) based
on objective criteria, such as the nature of the raw materials used or the
27 See, inter alia, G. van Calster, ‘China, Minerals Export, Raw Materials
and Rare Earth Materials: A Perfect Storm for World Trade Organisation Dispute
Settlement’, (2013) 22(1) RECIEL 117–22.
28 Border Tax Adjustment refers to aligning exported and imported goods
from the point of view of taxation, leading to rebates of the imposition of
domestically levied taxes.
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production processes employed; (ii) if it pursues economic or social
policy objectives which are themselves compatible with the requirements
of the Treaty and secondary law; and (iii) if it avoids any form of
discrimination, direct or indirect, with regard to imports from other
Member States or any form of protection of domestic products.
This jurisprudence-based exception applies even to products which are
‘similar’ (the EU term for ‘like’) within the meaning of Article 110
TFEU. The Court’s emphasis on the absence of any discrimination, direct
or indirect, in respect of imported produce, or any form of protection of
domestic products, is considered to be a safeguard against abuse.
This example of judicial activism remains in stark contrast with a
similar debate in the WTO, namely that of ‘like products’. The like
product issue is not the only area where judicial activism is possible in
the WTO. A renewed emphasis on the Headnote of GATT’s Article XX,
in particular, could well increase the role of the dispute settlement Panels,
and lead them from a purely textual interpretation of the Agreement to a
more teleological approach. The Appellate Body report in Shrimp/Turtle
has often been quoted for its ‘evolutionary’ approach: it stated, in
particular, that the interpretation of the term ‘exhaustible natural
resources’ is not static but evolutionary); however, case law since then, in
my view, has not exactly given WTO Members the clarity they require in
seeking to comply with WTO expectations.
One understandable concern with judicial activism in the WTO is the
‘slippery slope’ argument.29 The moment the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism decides to take a proactive stance in, say, the Trade and
Environment issue, could have ramifications, for instance, for the debate
on social clauses and all other ‘Trade and …’ issues. The argument
continues that even if the GATT may be able to cope with an important
part of the Trade and Environment issue through the normal application
of non-discrimination rules – so much so that Article XX need not even
be invoked30 – extending GATT rules and concepts beyond product
characteristics ‘might open the risk of GATT allowing potential import
restrictions based on thousands of societal and economic characteristics
29 That is, the ‘difficulty of a quasi “judicial” body consisting of three
experts making an interpretation which could have extensive ramifications (by
the operation of informal precedent and analogy) beyond the specific environ-
mental cases’: J. Jackson, ‘Greening the GATT: Trade Rules and Environmental
Policy’, in J. Cameron, P. Demaret and D. Geradin (eds), Trade and the
Environment: The Search for Balance (London: Cameron May, 1994), pp. 39–51,
at 43 (prior to the installation of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)).
30 Ibid.
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of the exporting’, and indeed the importing nation. In other words, the
argument goes that after decades of trade liberalization, states would be
allowed once again to retire into national values.
6.2 A Victim of its Own Success
A number of features of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism attract
‘Trade and …’ disputes. In environmental disputes, in particular, even if a
conflict includes states that are all parties to a multilateral environmental
agreement (MEA), for instance, these states often prefer to take recourse
to the WTO dispute settlement system. Outside the MEA context, one
alternative would be the International Court of Justice, which created a
special chamber for international environmental disputes in 1993, but
which so far has failed to attract the most high-profile cases.
The WTO dispute settlement process presents considerable attractions
to quarrelling states. These attractions are well reported. Firstly, the WTO
Agreements, including GATT, result in a comprehensive set of altogether
rather clear rules. Most MEAs include framework obligations only, the
precise content of which is moulded during Conferences of the Parties,
Resolutions, Working Party Reports and the like, the exact status and
interaction of which is far from clear. Furthermore and crucially, WTO
dispute settlement proceedings are fast, subject to a clear set of rules, and
enforceable.
Moreover, WTO dispute settlement now makes a much greater effort at
taking binding international regulatory law more or less fully into
account. The importance of the WTO abandoning legal isolationism has
been emphasized throughout the agreements and in dispute settlement
practice. WTO dispute settlement Panels, and the AB, have emphasized
that the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) obliges them to
apply any binding rule of public international law between the Members.
The DSU and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enable WTO
Members to adhere to a variety of international regulatory agreements.
Crucially, the further elaboration and clarification of international
regulatory law would serve the settlement of ‘Trade and …’ disputes in
the GATT/WTO.
7. ROOM FOR ‘POSITIVE HARMONIZATION’ WITHIN
THE WTO
The introduction of common minimum standards within the WTO
framework is not untested. The TRIPS Agreement, for instance, has
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introduced comprehensive obligations for the protection of private prop-
erty rights by requiring substantive minimum standards for the availabil-
ity, scope, use and protection of intellectual property rights. At the time
the Uruguay Round Agreements were signed, Ministers recognized that
the TRIPS Agreement could serve as an approach that could also be used
to harmonize domestic policy in other areas. The WTO Agreement itself,
in Article III states that:
the WTO shall provide the forum for the negotiations among its Members
concerning their multilateral trade relations in matters dealt with under the
[WTO Agreements]. The WTO may also provide a forum for further
negotiations among its Members concerning their multilateral trade relations,
and a framework for the implementation of the results of these negotiations,
as may be decided by the Ministerial Conference.
There is therefore arguably a mandate for the WTO to step into a wide
range of issues with a trade impact, including the coordination of
environmental harmonization efforts.
Of course, to the extent that harmonization is realized, this will not
ipso facto mean that all regulatory unilateralism will be ruled out and no
more disputes will arise. For instance, in the area of food and feed, even
if international harmonization is realized, the SPS Agreement expressly
authorizes Members to maintain higher standards (linked to a set of
appropriate conditions). The Preamble to that Agreement, furthermore,
expressly notes that harmonization is to be advanced without, however,
requiring Members to change their appropriate level of protection of
human, animal or plant life or health.
Harmonization techniques are plentiful. The most basic distinction is
between ‘mutual recognition’, whereby states accept each other’s stand-
ards in a given area as being equivalent, as opposed to some form of true
‘harmonization’ – alignment – of the different national standards. Har-
monization in a few well-defined areas could exceed the procedural and
methodological level. The improvement in transparency procedures could
serve as an interim solution for part of the tensions caused by the
development of national, regional and multilateral regulatory solutions.
It is clear that if positive harmonization is to form part of resolving
the ‘Trade and …’ debate at the WTO level, it will not be realized by the
WTO itself. Rather, the WTO should take proper account of the
developments in other international fora, such as the United Nations
Environment Programme, the International Standards Organization and
the Food and Agriculture Organization. The provisions of the TBT
Agreement could in this respect serve as an example (albeit also of slow
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progress). The creation of one global super-regulatory forum (or even one
such forum per regulatory issue), where the gradual coordination and
harmonization of environmental policies would take place, is arguably
neither feasible nor warranted. A realistic alternative is the establishment
of a set of international agreements for specific regulatory topics. One
needs to be realistic, though, in one’s expectations of these large
international negotiations. In the environmental field, for instance, the
greatest successes have been reached through singular, technically un-
disputed environmental threats (such as the threat to the ozone layer).
These are a far cry from multifaceted challenges, such as climate change.
8. MEGA-FTAs AND THEIR REGULATORY AGENDA
As part of the current range of alternatives for enhancing international
trade, many WTO Members are pursuing not just ever more regional
FTAs, but also so-called ‘mega-FTAs’. These are more extensive not so
much in terms of the products and services which they intend to, or do,
cover, but rather in the type of cooperation they envisage. The ambition
of all of these is to reach some kind of regulatory coordination which can
only be described as attempts at positive harmonization, albeit in varying
levels of intensity.
The most prominent of such attempts are, of course, the current
negotiations between the EU and the United States to create a Trans-
atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Both the European
Commission and the US have repeatedly announced that TTIP will only
be called a success to the extent that its regulatory coordination efforts
will be successful. (The more traditional elements of trade liberalization
of the agreement are considered to be more obviously realistic).
As regulatory priorities arguably reflect core societal values,31 these
negotiations, led by trade officials, have not failed to attract heavy
criticism on both sides of the Atlantic. It is also clear, however, that at the
very least, whether or not the talks will ultimately be successful, they
have already led to increased transparency and understanding of each
other’s regulatory process.32
31 See also G. van Calster, ‘Risk Regulation, EU Law and Emerging
Technologies: Smother or Smooth?’ (2008) 2(1) NanoEthics 61–71.
32 See, e.g., the following review for DG Trade: R. Parker and A. Alemanno,
Towards Effective Regulatory Co-operation under TTIP: a Comparative Over-
view of the EU and US Legislative and regulatory systems, May 2014, available
at http://goo.gl/7xRqAj (accessed 12 December 2014).
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The development of ambitious regulatory coordination agendas in
mega-FTAs arguably reflects a lack of belief that any real harmonization
effort can be reached in truly international negotiations.
9. CONCLUSION
It is very much this author’s view that blaming the ‘Trade and …’
conundrum on the lack of room within the WTO for regulatory consider-
ations is all too easy and wrong. There is a striking lack of unity among
the international regulatory community when it comes to dealing with
some of even the most pressing regulatory problems.
Consequently, managing the different regulatory responses of states is
of the utmost importance. This will require some degree of harmon-
ization, whether via the principle of mutual recognition or some degree
of ‘true’ harmonization.
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